The 2012 VAST Mini-Challenge 1 presented in excess of 158 million data points for analysis. The data consisted of network events from Bank of Money, a large organization whose branches spanned the entirety of fictional BankWorld, as well as the assets generating the events. Two network event datasets were used to analyze the network's state and determine what anomalies could be affecting it. The first dataset contained snapshot data of the network at 2 PM BankWorld Mean Time (BMT). The second contained all events from across the Bank of Money organization for the span of two days. Using the CoMotion ® platform, analysts determined several different causes for concern within the data, such as compromised machine statuses, missing datacenter events and anomalous events encompassing entire Regions.
INTRODUCTION
Bank of Money is the largest financial institution in the fictional BankWorld. The 2012 VAST Mini-Challenge 1 asked participants to create "a visualization of the health and Policy Status of the entire Bank of Money enterprise as of 2PM BMT (BankWorld Mean Time)" and highlight "up to five potential anomalies in the network and provide a visualization of each".
Tool -The CoMotion ® Platform
The team used General Dynamics' CoMotion † platform to perform these visual analytics. CoMotion is a collaborative, visual analytics tool focused on giving analysts an intuitive, direct manipulation interface to explore data using dynamic aggregation and drill-down. Simply by dragging data points to an alternate visualization, analysts can follow their interests and test hypotheses easily. New visualizations can be created on the fly, so analysts can tailor the tool to their questions and the analytic flow. CoMotion's collaborative capabilities allow analysts to share views of the data, highlight areas of concern, and make changes that immediately propagate to others using the tool. Even at scale, CoMotion aggregates data dynamically. This means that individual data points are still available when deeper analysis is required. The resulting free-form workflow gave the analysts on the team the opportunity to move efficiently from large aggregates to individual datum and back again. This agile analysis process closely mimics the "think loop process" as presented by Bodnar [1] in which analysts follow bottom up approaches in data analysis to build hypothesis, and then search from the top down to find evidence for their hypothesis.
INTERACTION-ENABLED ANALYTIC PROCESS
Upon initial consideration of the problem, the investigative team found three directions of attack. One of the data analysts theorized that lack of event data might be a significant variable. The team iterated early in the process over visualizations that described event patterns across many factors. Initial views of the data suggested some location-based issues, so exploration of time zone-based maps was conducted in the initial stages. The team felt that there would likely be some Policy Status deviations that they should explore, and so, several of the earliest analytics approaches focused on Policy Status for events. All investigations included visualization of data in a temporal context to determine trends over the entire time period. The fluid drag and drop of geospatially visualized data to temporal visualizations greatly enhanced the analytical workflow. The data analysis step progressed to an aggregated view of the data in the snapshot portion of the mini-challenge. This aggregated view presented significant anomalies to investigate. These anomalies became starting points for the analysis of the full dataset. Drill downs of both datasets as necessary ensured continuity in our hypothesis.
Instead of beginning with each mini-challenge section separately, the aggregate step included a significant amount of back and forth analysis of the snapshot dataset and the full dataset. Dragging the datasets to different instances of the same visualizations allowed quick identification of issues that required further drilldown. For example, the full map of all events shows the exact location of Datacenter 5, which seems to be missing from the 2 PM snapshot data (Figure 1 ). Using this method, the team found a single Policy Status 5 deviation, signifying a compromised or infected machine, in the 2PM dataset vs. numerous ones in the full dataset based on a visualization comparing Policy Status to Activity Flags. Overall * {lya.laberge, sid.kaul, naomi.anderson, charles.agnew, david.goldstein, john.kolojejchick}@gdc4s,com † CoMotion is a registered trademark of General Dynamics C4 Systems analysis of all the Regions then showed a spread of the compromised status that encompassed a significant amount of the network by the end of the second day. By dropping the one compromised machine in the 2 PM data into more specific views, analysts found its exact IP address at Datacenter 2. Analysts dragged this IP address to a chart depicting activity flags over time to search for anomalies overnight (Figure 2 ). There were no peripherals inserted, the machine showed no unusual CPU activity, and there existed no record of failed logins. Since the infection was not transmitted via a physical device, the team hypothesized that either the user touched a compromised site or email, or the machine simply had a vulnerable port that made it a target of attack and no user was involved. By placing the full dataset into the same visualization used in the 2 PM snapshot comparing business unit to policy level, analysts discovered the lack of Policy Status 1 events in Region 5 and Region 10 and found they continued through the full course of the data (Figure 3) . The reasons for this lack of events were not immediately clear. The description of Policy Status 2 deviations did not yield definitive guidance as to root cause. Dragging Datacenter 5 into a visualization of events by function and class over time depicted a pattern of very few servers functioning during part of the dataset and then coming online. A gap in reports could be explained by a power outage, but there were no comparable event losses in the branches surrounding the datacenter seen when comparing events in the tooltips to other similar offices (Figure 4 ). The team did find some other disconcerting threads regarding Policy Level 3 deviations, but they were of much less impact than the main anomalies. For example, in Region 5 the spread of Policy level 3 events seemed to originate in Branch 57 and spread through the e-mail servers. This was discovered by dragging events from a timeline chart to a chart depicting location versus machine class and function.
As research continued on the main anomalies, the analysts noted a pattern of workstations remaining on after close of business ( Figure 5 ). This occurred in clear violation of the business rules stated for the company and created a physical security risk. Extensive research into activity flags showed no definite compromises due to workstation remaining on, but activity flags do not show successful logins. Intrusion could occur overnight without indication in the event data. 
CONCLUSION
The CoMotion interaction physics provided a comfortable experience for data exploration. The information centric nature of the interface allowed analysts to drag and drop data aggregates that stood out from one chart to another. This enabled "think loop process" interactions where the analyst could easily move between drilling down from larger aggregates to explore hypotheses and exploring smaller groupings to form their hypothesis [1] .
By taking advantage of this facilitated exploration, analysts found several concerning anomalies in the Bank of Money network which were then explored more in depth.
